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The dispute related to how to commence judicial review proceedings in Zambia. The applicant in this 
matter commenced judicial review proceedings in the High Court of Zambia by way of applying for 
leave. In between the period after the High Court granted leave to hear the merits of the judicial review 
and the hearing date, the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), the Respondent filed 
an application to discharge the leave granted. It was at this point that the Applicants filed summons, to 
have the matter referred to the Constitutional Court to determine whether or not the requirement for 
leave is consistent with Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution, which came into force in 2016, which 
provides that justice in all courts of law shall be administered without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities. 
 
On the one hand, the applicant in this matter contended that whereas Order 53 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of England, which regulate judicial review proceedings, provided for the need for leave 
before commencing judicial review, this requirement is no longer consistent with the aforesaid 
constitutional provision. It was contended that the requirement for leave is a procedural technicality that 
hinders access to justice and hence should no longer be required. The Applicants also argued that the 
requirement for leave should only survive under the new constitutional dispensation if the requirement 
was backed up by a specific statute, like it is in England or Kenya. In the absence of a specific statute 
requiring leave in Zambia, the Applicants opined that this further underscored the view that there is no 
need for leave of court. The Applicants further argued that even if leave is still necessary, the other 
party cannot apply to discharge the leave because this too would be contrary to Article 118(2)(e) of the 
Constitution.  
 
The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the requirement to institute judicial review by way of 
obtaining leave of court is a substantive legal requirement. Therefore, even though Article 118(2)(e) 
provided that procedures should not impede a matter being heard on its merits, the requirement for leave 
cannot be dispensed with because this requirement relates to substantive law, not procedure.  
 
The Holding 
The Constitutional Court held that the requirement for leave to issue judicial review is a procedural 
requirement because it is a necessary condition that is required before judicial review matters can be 
heard. The court went further by holding that it is also a substantive requirement of the law because the 
leave allows the court to decide whether the matter is worth delving into the merits of the main matter. 
For these reasons the court held that the need to obtain permission of the court by applying for leave 
before the court can hear the merits of a judicial review matter is both a procedural and substantive 
requirement of the law. As the court put it, the requirement to first obtain leave, is part and parcel of the 
application for judicial review. 
 
In relation to whether the requirement for leave to issue judicial review offends Article 118(2)(e) of the 
Constitution, the court reasoned that the requirement for leave is not an undue regard for procedural 
technicalities. The court referred to the earlier Constitutional Court case of The People v. Henry 
Kapoko,1 which provided that the new provision in the Constitution does not intended to trump the 
primary object of any procedural requirement but that it will always be necessary to look at the 
circumstances of a particular case to determine if the procedure impedes justice or not.   
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It has been held in several cases such as the Dean Namulya Mung’omba and Others v Machungwa and 
Others2 and Attorney General v Nigel Kalonde Mutuna and 2 Others3 that the need for leave is essential 
for filtering out cases that are not worth the court’s further interrogation. The Constitutional Court 
thereby emphasized and underscored the point that Article 118(2)(e) is critical but should be applied 
with caution to avoid jeopardizing or overruling legal principles established in the past. Therefore, 
whereas the broad objective is to ensure that matters are heard on their merits, the court should not 
readily do away with established procedures, unless it would be just to do so. In the circumstances of 
judicial review, the Constitutional Court in this case held that the need for leave is a fair procedural and 
substantive requirement that boosts the attainment of justice. For this reason, the Court held that leave 
is still required in judicial review proceedings. 
 
The Significance 
The first case to consider and interpret the meaning of Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution was the 
decision in Henry Kapoko. In that case, the Court had to consider whether or not sections 207 and 208 
of the Criminal Procedure Code which provide that the accused person’s testimony must come before 
their witness should not be strictly adhered to. The accused person in that case did not view the rule as 
critical and opined that Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution permitted the rule to be circumvented as it 
was a mere procedural rule. In that case, the Court held that Article 118(2)(e) is intended to avoid a 
situation where a manifest injustice would be done by paying unjustifiable regard to a technicality. This 
reasoning was further underscored in this case where the court provided that the need for leave does not 
manifest injustice and should therefore not be done away with.  
 
For this reason, the Court in that case held that the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 
should not be viewed in isolation from the rest of the Act. Therefore, viewing the two provisions against 
the backdrop of the entire Act is necessary and in that case it was held that that procedural requirement 
is necessary to ensure the establishment of the trust and testing the cogency of the accused person’s 
testimony. 
 
The style of reasoning in the Henry Kapoko case was adopted in this case dealing with judicial review. 
The court looked at the provisions of Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England as well as 
the seminal judgments on judicial review holistically. Rather than looking at the requirement for leave 
in isolation, the Court looked at both the rationale for leave against the backdrop of the broad framework 
for judicial review to determine that it is a necessary step. 
Article 118(2)(e) is not intended to completely do away with all laid down rules of procedure but seeks 
to ensure that any procedures that manifest injustice should be avoided to ensure that justice is done in 
the circumstances of each other. In this regard, the requirement for leave in judicial review proceedings 
does not manifest any injustice but is a necessary step for the court to ensure the court is able to 
determine if a matter is worth being dealt with on the merits.  
 
The Constitutional Court in this case, like in Henry Kapoko, emphasised that if a rule is substantive in 
nature, it should not be dispensed with. In some cases, certain rules may appear to be merely technical 
or procedural steps. However, the Court here, clarified, as in Henry Kapoko, that there is need to 
determine if certain rules are substantive rules. Determining if a provision or rule is substantive can 
only be determined by looking at the relevant provision widely and within the context of its legislative 
framework. Following from Henry Kapoko, this case emphasised that certain procedural rules may also 
be substantive in nature and in such a case, they can never be dispensed with, unless they manifest 
injustice in some way. Determining whether the rule is substantive requires a careful exercise of in-
depth analysis against the framework that governs a particular rule.  
 
Once it is determined that a rule is substantive and not merely procedural, Article 118(2) (e) of the 
Constitution can never be used to do away with such a requirement. This point was also underlined by 
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the recent Supreme Court decision of GDC Logistics Zambia Limited v Joseph Kanyata and 13 others.4 
In such circumstances, the rules, which are also substantive in nature, should guide the court, as these 
rules are not merely procedural technicalities. In the Henry Kapoko case, the need for an accused to 
testify before witnesses was held to be substantive in nature because it regulated the rights and duties 
of witnesses to establish the truth of the accused’s testimony. In the same vein, the requirement for 
leave is substantive in nature because it is necessary for the court to determine the likelihood of the 
proceedings succeeding and establishment of a case requiring further interrogation. In other words, the 
Court here retained the requirement for leave because this requirement allows the Court to delve into 
the merits at a preliminary stage and hence there is no prejudice or injustice because the Court is in fact 
considering the substance of the case, albeit in a manner to determine if the matter on the merits should 
be entertained.  
 
Therefore the applicant’s argument, challenging the validity of the requirement of leave because it 
would detract from hearing the main case on its merits if leave is not granted, or subsequently 
discharged was untenable given that Article 118(2)(e) is actually being fulfilled because the procedural 
rule of leave also entails the court interrogating the substance of the matter. 
 
In the earlier Constitutional Court case of Sunday Chitungu Malaba v. Rodgers Mwewa and the Attorney 
General,5 the Court held that Article 118(2)(e) cannot be invoked to avoid the operation of an 
established rule merely because a party is anxious that a particular rule of procedure will be decided 
against them. Such a claim is sustainable and was reiterated by the Constitutional Court in this case. 
Here, the Court also emphasised that if a rule is substantive in nature and does not manifest injustice 
when applied, the court will be bound to apply it and it will not be a sufficient defence to argue that the 
application of the procedure will lead to a matter not being heard on its merits. 
 
What emanates from this case, as well as the earlier decisions that considered Article 118(2)(e) of the 
Constitution, is that this provision should not be applied by rote, but rather applied depending on the 
circumstances of each case and the particular procedural rule in question. The rule is not intended to do 
away with trite principles of procedure that have been laid down in statute or established by precedent, 
but where it is determined in the circumstances of a case that upholding the procedure will be unjust, 
the courts should not apply the rule – but this will depend on the factual matrix and specific provisions 
of a particular case.  The overriding principle that should guide the courts is whether or not the 
application of procedural rule in question is also substantive in nature and will lead to injustice being 
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